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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-RACE SHALL NOT BE
THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR IN CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT DRAWING.
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
Providing substance to Shaw v. Reno's ruling that racial gerrymanders
are justiciable,' Miller v. Johnson arose from Georgia to establish that
congressional districts face strict scrutiny when race is the predominant
factor in the drawing of their boundaries.2
Though black voters have traditionally filed suit under the Equal
Protection Clause to secure constitutional rights,3 the Miller plaintiffs were
white voters alleging discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.4
This turn-about has proven complex and troubling,5 especially in a state
haunted by historical and contemporary images of racial discrimination in
voting.6 This note seeks to explain the origins of the Supreme Court's new
test for racially motivated district drawing, a test resulting in an ironic
extension of the Equal Protection Clause: the boundaries drawn to diminish
racial discrimination are discriminatory themselves.
1. 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text for an
analysis of Shaw.
2. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995).
3. See generally, Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (concerning six black voters'
allegations in part that a Georgia county's single member commission excluded and limited
black influence in the political process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rogers
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (concerning eight black citizens' complaint in part that a
Georgia county's system of at-large elections violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
4. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485. The Equal Protection Clause resides in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The text of the amendment follows in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
5. The New York Times accused the Supreme Court of eviscerating the Voting Rights
Act and condemned the Miller decision as "bad law, sanctimoniously delivered." Gutting
the Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at A26.
6. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2501. After Reconstruction ended in 1877, Georgia effectively
precluded blacks from voting through the use of poll taxes, white primaries, property
requirements, and literacy tests. Id. Even as recently as 15 years ago, the Chairman of the
Georgia House Reapportionment Committee declared, "'I don't want to draw nigger
districts."' Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 501 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166
(1983).
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II. FACTS
The 1990 Decennial Census reported an increase in Georgia's
population, adding an eleventh congressional seat to the state's ten member
delegation.7 Accordingly, the Georgia General Assembly called a special
session in August 1991 to redraw its congressional districts.' Georgia had,
however, to seek preclearance of its plan from the United States Department
of Justice.9
Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Georgia is a covered
jurisdiction." As a result, the state must seek either administrative
preclearance from the United States Attorney General" or approval from the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enact changes
in its voting procedures."2
7. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483. The Constitution requires that "[rjepresentatives...
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers . . . . The actual Enumeration . . . within every
subsequent Term of ten years .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
8. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
9. Id.
10. 28 C.F.R. app. § 51 (1995). The United States Attorney General may designate
covered jurisdictions to police regions of the country whose histories demonstrate the prior
use of "tests or devices" to disenfranchise voters. As a consequence, the state must seek a
declaratory judgment in the District Court of the District of Columbia or approval from the
United States Attorney General to alter its voting "standard[s], practice[s], or procedure[s]."
Voting Rights Act § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Further, the Attorney General's decision
is not amenable to judicial review. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 507 (1977).
11. Voting Rights Act § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). The relevant text of the statute
reads in pertinent part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions
set forth [under 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1994)] ... are in effect shall enact or seek
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1964 .... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory
judgment that such qualification prerequisite, standard practice, or procedure does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race.., and until the court enters such judgment no
person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such
qualification ... : Provided, that such qualification ... may be enforced ... if
[it] . .. has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official
of such State ... to the Attorney General and ... [he or she] has not interposed
an objection within sixty days after such submission .... or upon good cause
shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days . . . the Attorney
General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made.
Id. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for an explanation of the history and
purpose of the Voting Rights Act.
12. Voting Rights Act § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Justice Ginsburg, in dissent,
observed that Georgia could have sought relief from the District Court of the District of
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The General Assembly submitted its first congressional redistricting
plan to the Department of Justice on October 1, 1991.13 This plan contained
two majority-black districts, the Fifth and Eleventh Districts. 4 This
increased the number of Georgia's majority-black districts; previously, the
state had only one.'5 However, the Department of Justice did not preclear
this plan, reasoning that only two majority-minority districts 6 had been
created, leaving some minority populations unrecognized because they were
not placed in majority-black districts. 7 Georgia's General Assembly tried
again with a new plan."8 This resulted in an increase in the black voting age
population in the Second District to forty-five percent while still retaining
the Fifth and Eleventh majority-black districts.' 9 However, the Department
of Justice again refused preclearance.2°
The grounds for the Justice Department's objection arose from a
comparison of Georgia's plan to the American Civil Liberties Union's
Columbia. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). However, the state viewed
this alternative as futile, given the similarities with Georgia's unsuccessful attempt in 1982
to contest preclearance demands. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp 1364, 1366 n. Il (S.D. Ga.
1994). The Georgia General Assembly enacted a reapportionment law in September 1981,
Act of Sept. 22, 1981, 1981 Ga. Laws Extra. Sess. 131 (reapportioning Georgia's 10
congressional districts), resulting in the drawing of the controversial Fifth District in Atlanta.
Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 498-500 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
The Fifth District's boundaries split a cohesive black community and excluded recognized
potential black candidates for the district. Id. at 499-500. The Attorney General objected
to the plan pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 497. Subsequently, the state
sought a declaratory judgment ruling that the reapportionment scheme did not deny or
abridge blacks' right to vote. Id. at 497. However, the district court found that "[t]he only
reason the Georgia General Assembly failed to enlarge the black population in the Fifth
District . . . was solely because the population was of the black race." Id. at 514-15.
Accordingly, the court denied relief. Id. at 518.
13. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
14. Id. The Second District also contained a concentration of voting-age blacks of 35%.
Id.
15. Id.
16. A majority-minority district may be defined as "an electoral district in which a
majority of both the registered voters and the voting age population are members of the same
racial minority." Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 417 n.3 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 1894 (1996). Thus, a majority-black district would be a majority-minority district.
Majority-minority districts themselves are not precluded as a per se distortion of minority
voting strength by § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155
(1993).
17. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483-84. For a listing of additional factors which the Justice
Department uses in evaluating potentially adverse effects of proposed redistricting, see 28
C.F.R. § 51.59 (1995).
18. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
19. Id.
20. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2484 (1995).
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(ACLU) "max-black" plan.2' The plan, which was drawn for the General
Assembly's black caucus, contained three majority-minority districts.22 The
Justice Department dictated that if demonstrable majority-minority districts
could be created, then plans not including them were insufficient. 3
This set the stage for the General Assembly's third attempt, which
reflected the ACLU's max-black plan.24 Using the ACLU's plan as a
benchmark, this effort created three majority-minority districts. The result
was a geographical "monstrosity."25 The new Eleventh District combined
black populations from metropolitan Atlanta with poor black populations
from coastal Savannah, populations separated by both distance and culture.26
Still, the Department of Justice approved the plan on April 2, 1992.27
Georgia subsequently held elections on November 4, 1992, and a black
candidate was elected from each of the three majority-minority districts.28
On January 13, 1994, Miller v. Johnson began when five white voters from
the Eleventh District sued state officials. 29 They contended that the Eleventh
District was a racial gerrymander 3° pursuant to Shaw v. Reno 3' in violation
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1363. Anyone can send plans to the Attorney General
relevant to a voting procedure change in a district subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
28 C.F.R. § 51.29 (1995). In Johnson, the Justice Department compared such plans with the
Assembly's schemes in order to analyze potential voting effects on black voting strength,
"i.e., if an alternative proposal had found some clever means of further boosting African-
American voting strength in Georgia, why hadn't the Assembly adopted it?" Johnson, 864
F. Supp. at 1368.
24. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484.
25. MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 356
(1993). Despite stretching from urban Atlanta to coastal Savannah, a distance of about 250
miles, 60% of all votes came from only three of 22 counties within the district. POLITICS
IN AMERICA 421 (Phil Duncan ed., 1993).
26. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484. The Court observed that "the social, political and
economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2485. Voters elected Cynthia McKinney from the Eleventh District. POLITICS
IN AMERICA 420 (Phil Duncan, ed., 1993). From the majority-black Second and Fifth
Districts, voters elected Sanford D. Bishop, Jr., id. at 396, and John Lewis, respectively. Id.
at 402.
29. 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995).
30. Id. A racial gerrymander is one in which a "legislature... intentionally draws one
or more districts along racial lines or otherwise intentionally segregates citizens into voting
districts based on their race." Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (W.D. La. 1993),
vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
31. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text
for an explanation of Shaw.
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of the Equal Protection Clause.32 A three-judge panel33 convened to hear the
case and concluded that the boundaries of the Eleventh District were
unconstitutional.34
III. BACKGROUND
Actions involving racial gerrymanders sit at the nexus of two voting
rights issues.31 Initially, gerrymanders require an analysis of the legitimacy
of racially motivated apportionments designed to enhance minority
representation. 36  Thus, equal protection issues of racial classification are
triggered by the question of motivation. However, this weighs against
another issue-the equality of votes-an issue that majority-minority
districts are designed to address.37
A. The Historical Context of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment is one of the primary guarantees of
minority voting rights.3" Ratified in 1868, the amendment came on the heels
of the Civil War. A year earlier, the Reconstruction Act of 1867 succeeded
in enfranchising blacks throughout the South.3 9 However, gains in black
political power were effectively terminated by the dawn of this century.40
The reasons were myriad--4he Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877,4 '
32. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485; see supra note 4 for the text of the Equal Protection
Clause.
33. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485. An action contesting the constitutionality of the
apportionment of congressional districts requires a panel of three district court judges. 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1988).
34. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1393. One jurist, Judge Edmondson, dissented from the
judgment. Id. at 1359.
35. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and
Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 21, 21 (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). See supra note 4 for the pertinent text of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
39. Paul Finkelman, Introduction, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE RIGHT To VOTE, at
viii (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992).
40. Davidson, supra note 38, at 21. See also Finkelman, supra note 39, at viii-ix,
noting that "[b]y the eve of World War I blacks in the South made up as little as 2 percent
of the voters in some states, and only as much as 15 percent in others."
41. Davidson, supra note 38, at 21. In 1876, republicans disputed election returns
which gave democrat Samuel Tilden a winning margin of 250,000 votes in the popular
presidential election. The following year, Congress appointed an Electoral Commission to
determine the election outcome. To gain southern democrats' support for a decision naming
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intimidation of black voters at the hands of southern whites,42 and Supreme
Court decisions gutting congressional enforcement measures43 while allowing
exclusionary devices like the poll tax." Not until 1954 did the Court apply
the Equal Protection Clause in a way that brought down racially discrimina-
tory walls.45 Finally, one-hundred years after Reconstruction, the federal
government secured full voting rights for blacks through the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.46
B. Racial Classifications
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court ruled that the application of laws
to only certain minorities violated the Fourteenth Amendment.47 In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors applied an ordinance
licensing laundries constructed of wood in a discriminatory manner to
prohibit Chinese laundries.4" Looking beyond the face of the otherwise race-
neutral ordinance, the Court held it invalid as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.49
Rutherford Hayes the winner, republicans promised in part to withdraw federal troops from
the South, effecting the compromise. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 300-02
(Richard B. Morris ed., 6th ed. 1982).
42. Davidson, supra note 38, at 21. One Mississippi democrat quoted in 1875 said,
"Carry the election peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must." Finkelman, supra note 39, at
viii.
43. Davidson, supra note 38, at 21. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to
"mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, color or persuasion .... "
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. However, the Civil Rights Cases limited the
scope of the Act to bar discrimination only from state action, not discrimination by
individuals. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding the substantive sections of
the Act unconstitutional).
44. Davidson, supra note 38, at 21. The case of Breedlove v. Suttles held that Georgia's
poll tax was constitutional. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283-84 (1937).
45. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation in
public schools solely on account of race is unequal). Ten years earlier the Court had held
that black voters could not be precluded from Texas's whites-only democratic primary.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62, 664-65 (1944). Smith was the first significant
breakthrough in Southern blacks' struggle for voting rights. DAVIDSON, supra note 38, at
22. However, Smith was an application of the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbids states
from denying or abridging citizens the right to vote on account of race. Smith, 321 U.S. at
666. See infra note 53 for the text of the Fifteenth Amendment.
46. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Voting
Rights Act, and see supra note 11 for the pertinent text of the Voting Rights Act.
47. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
48. Id. at 357-59.
49. Id. at 373. The Court stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance ... if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination between
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Not until 1960 did the Court apply the Yick Wo analysis to the voting
district context.5 In Gomillion v. Lighfoot,51 the state of Alabama passed
an act changing the city of Tuskegee's boundaries, effectually depriving
blacks from voting in municipal elections. 2 Though basing its decision on
the Fifteenth Amendment,53 the Court looked beyond the face of the act, as
it had in Yick Wo, and invalidated Alabama's act.54
Four years later in Wright v. Rockefeller," the Court entertained a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Congressional district boundaries.
Plaintiffs alleged that New York's 1961 congressional apportionment statute
had drawn irrational districts with the intent and effect of segregating
races.5 6  However, the Court refused to reach the equal protection issue,
holding that the lower court properly found that plaintiffs-appellants failed
to prove that racial considerations motivated the drawing of the districts'
boundaries.57
Despite the Court's insistence on discriminatory intent for an equal
protection claim in Wright, uncertainty lingered concerning the elemental
nature of intent. Was a clear racially disparate impact sufficient, or did the
persons . . . the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.
Id. at 373-74.
50. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text, explaining the reasons for the hiatus.
51. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
52. Id. at 341.
53. Id. at 342. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged... by any State on account of race ..
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
The petitioners also challenged the statute on Equal Protection grounds. Gomillion,
364 U.S. at 340. Concurring, Justice Whittaker wrote that "the decision should be rested not
on the Fifteenth Amendment, but rather on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 349.
54. Id. at 347-48.
55. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
56. Id. at 53-54.
57. Id. at 56, 58. The evidence in Wright contrasts with that in Johnson v. Miller.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence "that the specific boundaries ... were drawn on racial lines
or that the Legislature was motivated by considerations of race, creed or country of origin
in creating the districts." Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Instead, the plaintiffs relied solely on statistical evidence. Id.
Judge Feinberg, in his concurrence, presciently expounded the Shaw claim, noting "that
racially drawn districts per se would also violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment [is] . . . support[ed] in the per curiam decisions of the Supreme
Court following Brown v. Board of Educ..... ." Id. at 468-69 (Feinberg, J., concurring)
(noting Wright was a closer call than the majority opinion admitted). Nevertheless, Judge
Feinberg did not find the evidence to be indicative of race as a motivation in New York's
redistricting scheme, avoiding a prelude to Miller's predominant factor test. Id. at 469, 471.
See infra text accompanying notes 132-33 for an explanation of the predominant factor test.
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Constitution require intent as well? The Supreme Court resolved the issue
in Washington v. Davis, and mandated proof of intent for an equal
protection claim. 8 The plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia's
civil service test and other hiring procedures for police discriminated against
black applicants. 9 The Court, however, declared that the racially dispropor-
tionate impact of the test was not enough to state an equal protection
claim.6°
The Court expanded the evidentiary scope of the intent inquiry in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.61
Arlington Heights dealt with a village council's denial of a rezoning request
to create a low and moderate-income housing project within the village, a
project likely to be racially integrated.62 Noting that the village did not
intentionally discriminate based on race,63 the Court enumerated possible
evidence of intent, to wit: the impact of the government action on different
races, the historical background of the action, the events leading up to the
action, substantive and procedural departures from normal governmental
sequences, and legislative and administrative history. 64
A year later in the landmark case of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,65 the Supreme Court dealt with a racial classification
intended to remedy past discrimination. A white student brought an equal
protection claim after being excluded from admission to the Medical School
of the University of California at Davis.66 The alleged violation was the
use of race to screen applicants for a limited number of special admissions
slots 67 to the entering class. Holding that the school's special admissions
program was a racial classification, a majority of the Court concluded that
racial distinctions of any kind are "inherently suspect' 68 but proceeded to
58. 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). The Court stated that "the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose." Id. at 240.
59. Id. at 233.
60. Id. at 239. The Court did not preclude racial impact as evidence of a discriminatory
racial purpose. Id. at 241. In fact, the "totality of the relevant facts" can imply an invidious
discriminatory purpose. Id. at 242.
61. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
62. Id. at 257-58.
63. Id. at 270.
64. Id. at 266-68. See infra note 131 and accompanying text for the Court's use of
Arlington Heights in Miller.
65. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 276-78.
67. Id. at 276. The trial court found that white applicants were precluded from the 16
special admissions slots. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1159 (Cal.
1976).
68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (Powell, J.). Justice Powell stated that "[r]acial and ethnic
[Vol. 19
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apply two types of scrutiny69 with mixed results. 70 A different group of five
justices affirmed the California court's judgment admitting Bakke to the
medical school,71 with a plurality of four deciding on statutory, not
constitutional grounds.72
Many years after Bakke,73 the Supreme Court finally resolved its
approach to remedial racial classifications in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. 74  The Court analyzed the constitutionality of a Richmond,
Virginia, ordinance dealing with public works contracts." The ordinance
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination." Id. (concluding that the special admissions program was constitutionally
invalid, but that race can be considered in admissions decisions when it is a non-dispositive
factor).
69. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. Justice Powell would have applied current strict scrutiny.
Id. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun delineated a different approach, stating
that it "should be strict-not "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact . I... d. at 361-62 (quoting
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972)). The latter justices' level of scrutiny considered whether a racial classification meant
to remedy past discrimination met important governmental objectives and was substantially
related to those objectives. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313, 317 (1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))).
Currently, equal protection cases submit to three standards of review: (1) the rational
basis test, used when no basis for independent judicial examination of a government
classification exists and which results in a violation only if the law has no rational
relationship to a valid government interest; (2) the intermediate standard of review, applied
notably to gender cases, under which a classification must bear a substantial relationship to
an important government interest; and (3) strict scrutiny, applied to classifications of race or
national origin, which necessitates that the classification be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling government interest. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.3, at 20-22 (2d ed. 1992).
70. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed
with Justice Powell as to the application of strict scrutiny and reached the constitutional issue
concerning equal protection. Id. at 361-62. Unlike Justice Powell, however, this faction held
the admissions program constitutional. Id. at 325.
71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (Burger, C.J., Powell, Stewart, Rehnquist, & Stevens, JJ.).
72. Id. at 320.
73. In the interim, the Court continued to wrestle with the proper standard of review for
remedial racial classifications, notably in the context of personnel cases. For example, in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a plurality of four justices agreed that strict scrutiny
would apply when racial preferences were used in a school district's layoff procedures.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (holding the measures
unconstitutional). This was not enough, however, to establish strict scrutiny as a universal
standard.
74. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Earlier, the Court divided over the scrutiny applicable to a
federal public works program using minority business enterprise classifications in Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Id. at 453-56. A plurality held the statute constitutional
under both strict and intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 491-92 (Burger, C.J.). Three justices
upheld it on intermediate scrutiny alone. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
75. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 477.
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required contractors to subcontract thirty percent of the dollar amount of
their contracts to a class of subcontractors labeled minority business
enterprises (MBEs).76 Declaring that strict scrutiny applied to all racial
classifications, the Court applied its most searching review, 77 and held the
ordinance unconstitutional.
78
The Court extended its application of the Equal Protection Clause to
racial gerrymanders in Shaw v. Reno.79 The North Carolina legislature
created peculiarly shaped congressional districts in deference to preclearance
objections made by the Justice Department.80 Commentators characterized
one of the districts as a "Rorschach ink-blot test"8I and a "ketchup spill." 
82
The Shaw plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court alleging that the district
was a racial gerrymander violating the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Deciding
only whether the appellants stated an equal protection claim against the state
appellees," the Court held the congressional district so irrational on its face
that it precluded any explanation other than racial segregation of voters does
support a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.85
76. Id. The ordinance defined an "MBE" as a business in which minorities who are
either "Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts" own or control 51%
of the firm. Id. at 478.
77. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J). For the first time, a majority of the Court agreed to apply
strict scrutiny regardless of "the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification." Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986));
see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (O'Connor, J.)
(holding that strict scrutiny also applies under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause to
federal actions).
78. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 498, 508. The Court found no evidence identifying
discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. Id. at 505. Thus, no compelling
government interest existed. Id. The Court also disposed of the second prong of strict
scrutiny, narrow tailoring, because no evidence existed that any minority other than blacks
had suffered discrimination. Id. at 506. Further, the Court found that no race-neutral means
or individualized procedures were considered. Id. at 507-08.
79. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
80. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). The North Carolina legislature had already created another
bizarrely shaped majority-minority district, the First District. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 463 n.2.
81. Max Boot, Supreme Court Rules That "Bizarre" Districts May Be Gerrymanders,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 30, 1993, at 7. The other district in Shaw was shaped like
a snake. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635. Though it was 160 miles long, it was no wider than the
Interstate 85 corridor for much of its length. Id. This inspired one state legislator to remark
that "if you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people
in the district." Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting: White Voters
Challenge Black-Majority Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4.
82. Back To The Ghetto?, THE EcONOMIST, July 10, 1993, at 13.
83. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 468.
84. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658.
85. Id. (reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding for analysis of the
racial gerrymander claim and if proven, a subsequent determination of whether the
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C. The Equality of Votes
Persistent widespread discrimination in voting practices continued
despite early court victories in the late 1950S.86 Frustrated by the insidious
nature of lingering devices used to deny blacks the franchise, Congress acted
to ensure voting equality.87 Pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment,88
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 196589 to eradicate racial
discrimination in voting.9" This new tool provided the government with
several remedies-a suspension of literacy tests and similar devices, a
suspension of new voting regulations until approval by federal authorities,
and federal examiners to list qualified voters. 91
However, the Supreme Court had not been listless in the area of voting
rights. Prior to the Voting Rights Act, the Court held in Baker v. Carr that
a vote dilution92 claim was justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment.93
classification was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest). On remand, the
district court held the plan did pass strict scrutiny. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 476
(E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). Ultimately, the Supreme Court held on
appeal that the district was not narrowly tailored to the State's compelling interest in
complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Shaw v. Hunt II, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
Much criticism has been leveled at Shaw v. Reno. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham
et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994) (comparing Shaw to Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred Scott
v. Sandford); David Kairys, Race Trilogy, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (1994) (noting that Shaw has
reversed racial roles); Earl M. Maltz, Political Questions and Representational Politics: A
Comment on Shaw v. Reno, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 711 (1995) (arguing that Shaw falls within the
nonjusticiable political question doctrine).
86. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2437, 2440. Prosecution of voting-rights cases on an individual basis overwhelmed the
ability of the Justice Department to enjoin continuing voting-rights violations on a discrete,
case-by case level using prior civil rights legislation. Thus, the preclearance provisions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided a mechanism under which the burden of proof and
prosecution could be switched to the offending jurisdictions, braking efforts to circumvent
minority voting equality. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182.
87. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2437, 2440-42.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See supra note 53 for the amendment's text.
89. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2437. In 1966, the Supreme Court upheld the Voting Rights Act as a
constitutional means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (noting that "millions of non-white Americans will now be able
to participate for the first time on an equal basis in the government under which they live.").
91. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973-1973p (1988); H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2437.
92. A vote dilution claim involves an impairment of a group's ability to elect candidates
of their choice by submerging a minority into a majority group district. Thornburg v.
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Subsequently, plaintiffs in the landmark case of Reynolds v. Sims94 asserted
a denial of equal suffrage stemming from the Alabama legislature's failure
to reapportion state legislative districts for fifty-three years.95 Addressing
the dilution claim, the Supreme Court held that seats in bicameral legisla-
tures must be apportioned on a population basis96 to secure equality of votes
under the Equal Protection Clause.97
Following congressional enactment of the Voting Rights Act, the court
explicated the retrogression test of section 5 of the Act in Beer v. United
States.98 The city of New Orleans had sought a declaratory judgment under
section 5 of the Act' to implement a councilmanic reapportionment creating
two majority black districts."' Under the prior apportionment scheme, no
district had a majority of black voters.'0 ' In a holding limited to construing
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,102 the Court declared that a
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.12 (1986). A vote fragmentation claim is the splitting of
"geographically cohesive minority groups that are large enough to constitute majorities in
single-member districts ...." Id.; see Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (applying
the Gingles test to a vote fragmentation claim). The Court has yet to rule on the validity of
a third claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, an "influence dilution" claim. Voinovich
v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993) (addressing an influence dilution claim but holding on
other grounds). In this latter claim, an otherwise influential minority in several districts is
packed into a lesser number of super-majority majority-minority districts. Id.
93. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
94. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
95. Id. at 537, 540.
96. Id. at 568. The Court explained that the right to vote is "unconstitutionally impaired
when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living in other parts of the State." Id. Earlier, Gray v. Sanders had established the famous
"one person, one vote" maxim. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). Extending
Gray, Wesberry v. Sanders applied this principle to congressional apportionments. Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (basing its holding on Article I, § 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
97. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.
98. 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976). The retrogression test precludes a decrease in minority
voting strength occurring as a result of redistricting. Id. at 141. Thus, a change meets the
test "if minorities are equally well off or better off after the change than before it, even if
the change leaves undisturbed a status quo that still does not fairly reflect minority voting
strength." Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61
N.C.L. REv. 189, 195 (1983) (criticizing the reliability of the retrogression test).
99. See supra note 11 for the pertinent text of the Act.
100. Beer, 425 U.S. at 136. Though black population majorities composed both districts,
only one of the two districts possessed a majority of black voters. Id.
101. Id. at 141-42.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
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reapportionment enhancing the exercise of racial minorities' electoral
franchise" 3 does not dilute votes within the meaning of section 5." 4
The following year, a divided Court considered whether a state's use
of racial criteria to comply with the Voting Rights Act was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifteenth Amendment."°5 In United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, the New York
legislature split an Hasidic Jewish community of 30,000 people into two
senate and two assembly seats." 6 The impetus for the split was a desire to
secure the approval of the United States Attorney General" 7 for reapportion-
ing covered jurisdictions.'08  The plaintiffs alleged violations of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, arguing that the plan would dilute
residents' votes."° A plurality of the Court held that states could intention-
ally create majority-black districts to comply with section 5, allowing the
use of race as a districting criterion."'
Despite the endurance of the Voting Rights Act in United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc., the Court did effect a change in the
Act."' In City of Mobile v. Bolden," 2 black plaintiffs brought suit alleging
that at-large elections of a three-member city commission established a vote
103. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. The Court referred to such a plan as an "ameliorative"
apportionment. Id.
104. Id. The Court based its reasoning on the rationale of the Act, "the purpose of § 5
has always been to insure that no voting procedure changes would be made that would lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise
of the electoral franchise." Id.
105. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 148 (1977).
106. Id. at 152. Previously, the community had resided in one assembly district and one
senate district. Id. See infra note 158 and accompanying text for more analysis of this case
as applied to Miller.
107. Carey, 430 U.S. at 148, 152. The state reapportionment committee's own report
stated that the changes were made to defeat Justice Department objections. Id.
108. Id. See supra note 10 for an explanation of covered jurisdictions.
109. Carey, 430 U.S. at 152-53. Interestingly, the plaintiffs also asserted that they were
placed within districts because of race, further diluting their votes under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Id. at 153. This assertion contrasts with Shaw v. Reno's complaint, alleging
improper racial classification under the Fourteenth Amendment. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 637 (1993).
110. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 161, 162. Justice White commented that "[s]ection 5 and its
authorization for racial redistricting where appropriate to avoid abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color are constitutional." Id. at 161 (plurality opinion). In dissent,
Chief Justice Burger responded, "If Gomillion teaches us anything, I had thought it was that
drawing of political boundary lines with the sole, explicit objective of reaching a
predetermined racial result cannot ordinarily be squared with the Constitution." Id. at 181.
111. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 179 (restoring the pre-Bolden effects standard).
112. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause."' Citing past prece-
dents," 4 the Court stated that one must show more than disproportionate
impact on race alone;" 5 one must also show an intent to discriminate. "
6
As a result, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
require only a showing of discriminatory effect as a violation of the
section." 7 The "results test,""' as this new standard was known, created a
"totality of the circumstances""' 9 inquiry to determine vote dilution injuries
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.'
21
In sum, it was the Scylla of this amendment to the Voting Rights Act
that forced Georgia into the Charybdis of Shaw's equal protection claim.
IV. REASONING
Miller v. Johnson began when white voters from Georgia's Eleventh
congressional district sued state officials alleging the 1990 congressional
113. Id. at 58. Plaintiffs also claimed violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. The Court held neither was meritorious. Id. at 61, 65.
114. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (discussed supra at notes 61-64 and accompanying text); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discussed supra at notes 58-60 and accompanying text); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (discussed supra at notes 55-57 and accompanying text).
115. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980).
116. Id. at 69. The Court held that the plaintiffs had not met this burden. Id. at 70.
117. Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988) (amended 1992). The amended
provision reads:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color ....
Id.
118. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
119. Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). The relevant part of § 1973(b)
states:
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice ....
Id. (emphasis added). Circumstances probative of vote dilution are the history of official
discrimination touching voting, racial polarization in voting, voting practices offering
opportunities for minority discrimination, denial of minority access to slating, discrimination
in the social sphere impacting on voting, race-baiting political campaigns, and minority
electoral success. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
120. Voting Rights Act § 2. See supra note 119 for the change.
[Vol. 19
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
redistricting plan was a racial gerrymander.12" ' A district court agreed with
the plaintiffs and overturned the redistricting plan.'22
Justice Kennedy authored the majority's opinion, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. The Court
premised its analysis on the Equal Protection Clause. 23  Current equal
protection analysis holds that any classifications made on the basis of race
are intrinsically suspect and require the highest level of judicial examina-
tion--strict scrutiny.'24 Consequently, these classifications must be "narrow-
ly tailored to achiev[e] a compelling state interest."' 25  Further, these
principles apply to a State's creation of congressional districts under Shaw
v. Reno.
26
Turning to an analysis of Shaw v. Reno, the Court dispensed with the
notion that a Shaw claim requires a threshold showing of bizarreness.
27
Initially, appellants argued that Shaw required a district's shape to be so
bizarre that only race could explain its borders. 28  The Court, however,
rejected this reading of Shaw.129 Instead, shape is simply evidence that race
was the legislature's dominant purpose in drawing the district. 3 ' Accord-
ingly, evidence apart from shape is also relevant to establish race-based
districting, and parties need not cross a threshold of bizarreness.'
The Court then set out the test for a racial gerrymander claim. A
plaintiff must prove that race was the predominant factor motivating a
121. 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995).
122. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
123. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482. See supra note 4 for the text of the Equal Protection
Clause.
124. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995) (providing a doctrinal basis for strict
scrutiny of all race-based classifications). See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for
an explanation of Croson.
125. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482.
126. Id. at 2483; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See supra notes 79-85 and
accompanying text for an analysis of Shaw.
127. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485.
128. Id. at 2485, 2486. Others have mistakenly agreed with this test of appearance. See,
e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 483, 484 (1993) (describing Shaw as a "district appearance claim").
129. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2488. The Court has previously stated that "[s]ometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face .... Absent a [stark] pattern...
the Court must look to other evidence." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for an analysis of
Arlington Heights.
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legislature's decision to include or exclude a significant number of voters
from a particular district."' Doing so requires a showing that a legislature
submerged the use of traditional districting principles to racial consider-
ations. '33
Applying the test to the facts, the Court affirmed the trial court's
findings'34 and concluded that race was the "predominant, overriding factor"
informing the General Assembly's drawing of the Eleventh District.'35
Failing the predominant factor test, Georgia's plan had to pass the Court's
test of strict scrutiny.'36 Georgia argued that it had a compelling interest in
meeting the Justice Department's preclearance mandates. 37 The Court re-
fused to accept this argument, because it would have resulted in a surrender
to the Executive Branch of the Court's power to enforce constitutional limits
concerning official race-based action. 38
132. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. The Court recently dealt with a mixed motive case in
which race was one of several considerations, e.g., incumbency protection. Bush v. Vera,
No. 94-805, 1996 WL 315857 at *5 (U.S. June 13, 1996). After an exhaustive review of the
evidence, the Court upheld the district court's order declaring that certain Texas
congressional districts were racial gerrymanders and unconstitutional under strict scrutiny
review. Id. at *20.
133. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. These traditional factors are as follows: compactness,
contiguity, and common community interests. Id.
134. Id. In addition to the shape and racial demographics of the Eleventh District, the
Court listed the following evidence: the Justice Department's letters that only three majority-
minority districts would suffice; the testimony of Linda Meggers, an expert on Georgia
redistricting; the State of Georgia's admission that it would not have allowed the Macon-
Savannah trade absent the Justice Department's objections; the State's admission that it split
voting precincts to increase black population in the Eleventh District; and the State's
concession in its brief to the Court that the Eleventh is a product of an intent to create a
majority black district. Id. at 2489.
135. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court found that the State's proffered explanations
were not justified. Id. at 2489. The Court cited the Georgia Attorney General's objection
to the Justice Department's insistence on a third majority-black district, an objection made
on the grounds that it disregarded any standard of compactness or contiguity. Id. at 2489-90.
The Court also did not find communities of interest in the Eleventh District. Id. at 2490.
See infra note 157 for a refutation of this point.
136. Id. at 2490.
137. Id. at 2491. Though remedying the effects of past racial discrimination is a
significant state interest, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993), Georgia did not make that
argument. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court noted the argument would have been
specious anyway. Id. Nor was the Justice Department's max-black policy a compelling
interest. Id. at 2491.
138. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704
(1974) (stating that "judicial power... can no[t] be shared with the Executive Branch");
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (noting that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
1996] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Court concluded further that the Justice Department's previous
objections were misplaced. Georgia's initial plans were ameliorative" 9 and,
therefore, not amenable to the Justice Department's attacks based on section
5 of the Voting Rights Act. 40 Thus, the Court ended the opinion with a
rejection of the max-black policy, finding no intent on the part of Congress
to extend the application of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act so widely. 4'
In conclusion, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the decision.'42
Justice O'Connor, concurring, agreed with the majority's test.'43 Her
separate opinion sought to reassure states that the majority of congressional
districts are constitutionally secure despite the presence of racial consider-
ations in their creation.' 44
Justice Stevens dissented both individually and with Justice Ginsburg.1
45
Distinguishing his opinion, he argued that the plaintiffs "suffered [no]
legally cognizable injury."'" He contended that the Shaw injury 14 was too
139. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for an explanation of ameliorative plans.
One scholar has said that Miller reaffirmed the Court's commitment to Beer. Richard
C. Reuben, A 'Simple Command' Creates Confusion, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 19 (quoting
Prof. James Blumstein of Vanderbilt University School of Law).
140. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492.
141. Id. at 2493. The potential application of the Voting Rights Act in a subversive
manner has not escaped notice. See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION & MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 235 (1987) (arguing that the Voting
Rights Act has evolved from a beneficent law insuring equal votes to a divisive entitlement
of equal racial representation). Justices Thomas and Scalia have also previously rejected this
policy, stating "few devices could be better designed to exacerbate racial tensions than the
consciously segregated districting system currently being constructed in the name of the
Voting Rights Act." Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2599 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
142. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2494 (1995). On remand, the Georgia General
Assembly failed to redraw the districts, and the task reverted to the district court. Johnson
v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
143. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. Id. Justice O'Connor sought to narrow the decision's implications, stating that its
application would "help(] achieve Shaw's basic objective of making extreme instances of
gerrymandering subject to meaningful judicial review." Id.
145. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Justice Stevens called this a "representational harm," and defined it using Shaw's
language as follows: "When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as a whole." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
648 (1993)).
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elusive,'48 and that only a claim of vote dilution could sustain an injury on
these facts.'49
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent,50 disagreed with the Court over the
degree to which legislative considerations of race offend the Equal
Protection Clause.' 5' Reiterating that courts are not the governmental branch
best suited for drawing district lines,'52 Ginsburg explained the history of
judicial involvement in redistricting in Georgia.'53 Historically, the Court
applied the Equal Protection Clause to preclude the dilution of minority
voting strength, viz., apportionment plans.' 54
Distinguishing Shaw v. Reno 155 from that history, she observed that
traditional redistricting factors were essentially excluded from consideration
in the creation of the Shaw district.'56 Thus, Shaw differed from the present
case because Georgia's Eleventh District did not subordinate traditional
districting principles to race."'
148. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court's analogy of a Shaw
injury to desegregation cases troubled Justice Stevens. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He felt
the latter cases dealt with exclusionary policies, yet the Miller plaintiffs contested a measure
concerning the inclusion of too many black voters in one district. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For Justice Stevens, a violation would occur "when
[districting plans] serve no purpose other than to favor one segment... that may occupy a
position of strength ... or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community."
Id. at 2499 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
150. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She was joined by Justices
Stevens, Breyer, and in part by Justice Souter. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent did find common ground on
several points, to wit: that judicial intervention in redistricting is exceptional; that voting
inequality has existed historically along racial lines; that legislatures must consider race when
redistricting; and that states may recognize communities having a racial make-up. Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
153. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg listed
devices the Georgia legislature had enacted to preclude post-Reconstruction voting by blacks,
such as cumulative poll taxes, white primaries, and property and literacy tests. Id. at 2501
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Not until passage of the Voting Rights Act, with the Acts'
consequent judicial involvement, were Georgians able to elect black congresspersons. Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Further, not until 1981 did Georgia gain a majority-minority
district. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2501 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
156. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2502 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to the following traditional
factors: the total land area of the district is average for the state; the length of the border is
equivalent to other Georgia districts; relative to other districts in the state, the Eleventh
District does not discount political subdivisions such as counties; and nonracial considerations
were involved in its creation. Id. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Nor did the dissent find
on the Miller facts that the Justice Department forced the Eleventh District's boundaries on
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The dissent also argued that apportionment itself was unique, refuting
the majority's view that the Constitution's blinders permit the Court to see
only individuals and not interest groups.' Ginsburg contended that
districting requires that people be treated as groups, not individuals. 59
Accordingly, the history of strict scrutiny accounted for a consideration of
group identity, precluding it from the context of majority voters' constitu-
tional claims.' 6
Concluding with a Parthian blow, Justice Ginsburg argued that the
Court's decision would "render[] redistricting perilous work" for states.' 61
Consequently, Ginsburg predicted that only future litigation would assure
states of secure districts. 6
2
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Miller decision is the Court's first case to determine when a racial
gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, Miller provides a
test with which to sort racial gerrymander claims. 63
the General Assembly using the max-black plan as a model. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2504
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See supra note 135 and accompanying text for a refutation of this
point.
158. Id. at 2505-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As authority for this proposition, Justice
Ginsburg cited United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey. Id. at 2505 n. 11
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Considering that case to be on point with Miller's facts, Justice
Ginsburg read United Jewish Orgs. as allowing for the intentional creation of majority-
minority districts. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg is not alone in her view.
See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 7 SUP.
CT. REv. 245, 275-76 (1993) ("The claim that race-conscious redistricting was per se
unconstitutional had been rejected by a fractured Supreme Court in United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey."). However, the majority distinguished analogies to United Jewish
Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, which dealt with a vote dilution claim, not a racial
gerrymander as in Miller. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
159. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent noted the fact that the majority can
exercise political power relieved the Court of the burden of applying "extraordinary judicial
solicitude" in these cases. Id. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not
concur in this part of the opinion. Id. at 2499.
161. Id. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
162. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Gerald Gunther of Stanford
Law School agreed, saying "the decision leaves a lot of questions unanswered." Reuben,
supra note 139, at 18.
163. Commentators have sagely noted this need. See, e.g., Alexander Aleinikoff &
Samuel Issacharoff, Race & Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno,
92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 618 (1993) ("Shaw fails [to offer meaningful constitutional
oversight] ... unless state actors can put its commands into operation.").
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Miller also appears vital as an extension of the majority's commitment
to a race neutral application of the Constitution."'4 The Court appears
willing to extend the Equal Protection Clause uniformly, viewing challenged
laws without consideration of their racial histories. The Court's past
decisions,'65 subjugating racial and ethnic classifications to an egalitarian
paradigm,166 make this plausible.
Further, the Court's treatment of the Justice Department's application
of the Voting Rights Act reveals a limit on executive enforcement of the
Act.'67 The Court is seemingly unwilling to balance the Fifteenth Amend-
ment right to vote with the Equal Protection Clause,'68 instead choosing to
draw a bright line on the issue of race-based districting.
Finally, the effect of Miller on all state-created districts is mammoth.
Each state and local district is now open to attack based on the circum-
stances of its birth.'69 Notably, this includes Arkansas' own judi-cial
districts which have already been challenged on equal protection grounds. 70
VI. CONCLUSION
Miller v. Johnson sets out judicially manageable standards under which
lower courts can resolve racial gerrymander claims. If race is the predomi-
nant factor in a legislature's decision to place voters inside or outside the
164. Cf. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REv. 213, 309 (1991). Michael Klarman has characterized this as a shift from
identifying racially discriminatory classifications using a functional analysis of a group's
historical and contemporary power to a "relevance" approach which precludes application of
racial classifications deemed irrelevant. Id.
165. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
166. Justice Scalia put it succinctly, saying "[i]n the eyes of government, we are just one
race here. It is American." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
167. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493. The Court declared "[t]here is no indication Congress
intended such a far-reaching application of § 5, so we reject the Justice Department's
interpretation of the statute .... " Id.
168. Id. Though stating that a proper exercise of Congress's Fifteenth Amendment
power was subject to Fourteenth Amendment limits, the Court avoided balancing the Voting
Rights Act with equal protection mandates, concluding that the Justice Department's max-
black policy was beyond the scope of Congress's intent. Id.
169. After the affirmance of Miller v. Johnson, the same Georgia court also declared the
Second District unconstitutional. Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (S.D. Ga.
1995). Georgia's state legislative districts were later challenged. See Johnson v. Miller, No.
CIV. A. 196-140, 1996 WL 288936 (S.D. Ga. June 18, 1996) (refusing to grant a preliminary
injunction for Georgia's July primaries).
170. Ronald Smothers, Black Districts Under Fire in Arkansas, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
April 11, 1996, at D8.
[Vol. 19
1996] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129
borders of a congressional district, then the district fails as an unconstitu-
tional racial classification. In determining whether racial intent is the
predominant factor, the Court has incorporated past equal protection
analysis, clearly enlarging the scope of the evidentiary inquiry beyond the
facts in Shaw v. Reno. Therefore, racial gerrymander claims now fall
squarely within established equal protection precedent.
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